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GetObject

AWS

GetObject

service: AWS - S3
techniques:

Event

Retrieves (downloads) an object from an S3 bucket; logged in CloudTrail only when S3 data events are enabled.

Security Context

  • Accessing cloud storage objects can expose sensitive data including backups, configuration files, application data, and customer information.
  • Transferring data to external cloud accounts or regions can bypass network-based data loss prevention controls and exfiltrate large volumes of data.

Log Source

CloudTrail

Sample Event

Adversarial — exfiltration. Draco — using federation-token credentials he obtained earlier (see aws-getfederationtoken) — downloads a NIFFLER PII parquet file (pii/2026-04/customer-pii-export.parquet) from fantasticlogs-niffler-archive. Cross-region read (us-west-2 source bucket, caller in us-east-1) and adversary IP make this a high-fidelity exfil signal. T1530 + T1537.

{
"eventVersion": "1.09",
"userIdentity": {
"type": "FederatedUser",
"principalId": "555123456789:draco-fed",
"arn": "arn:aws:sts::555123456789:federated-user/draco-fed",
"accountId": "555123456789",
"accessKeyId": "ASIADRAC0FED0SESS00666",
"sessionContext": {
"sessionIssuer": {
"type": "IAMUser",
"principalId": "AIDADRAC0MALF0YBADGY",
"arn": "arn:aws:iam::555123456789:user/draco",
"accountId": "555123456789",
"userName": "draco"
},
"attributes": {
"creationDate": "2026-04-15T21:21:38Z",
"mfaAuthenticated": "false"
}
}
},
"eventTime": "2026-04-15T21:28:54Z",
"eventSource": "s3.amazonaws.com",
"eventName": "GetObject",
"awsRegion": "us-west-2",
"sourceIPAddress": "203.0.113.66",
"userAgent": "[aws-cli/1.18.147 Python/3.7.10 Linux/5.4.0-1045-aws botocore/1.18.6]",
"requestParameters": {
"bucketName": "fantasticlogs-niffler-archive",
"Host": "fantasticlogs-niffler-archive.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com",
"key": "pii/2026-04/customer-pii-export.parquet"
},
"responseElements": null,
"additionalEventData": {
"SignatureVersion": "SigV4",
"CipherSuite": "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
"bytesTransferredIn": 0,
"AuthenticationMethod": "AuthHeader",
"x-amz-id-2": "EXAMPLEEXAMPLEEXAMPLEEXAMPLE/EXAMPLEEXAMPLEEXAMPLEEXAMPLEEXAMPLEEXAMPLEEXAMPLEEXAMPLE",
"bytesTransferredOut": 1834521088
},
"requestID": "90000000-0000-4000-8000-000100111110",
"eventID": "90000000-0000-4000-8000-000100111111",
"readOnly": true,
"resources": [
{
"type": "AWS::S3::Object",
"ARN": "arn:aws:s3:::fantasticlogs-niffler-archive/pii/2026-04/customer-pii-export.parquet"
},
{
"accountId": "555123456789",
"type": "AWS::S3::Bucket",
"ARN": "arn:aws:s3:::fantasticlogs-niffler-archive"
}
],
"eventType": "AwsApiCall",
"managementEvent": false,
"recipientAccountId": "555123456789",
"eventCategory": "Data",
"tlsDetails": {
"tlsVersion": "TLSv1.3",
"cipherSuite": "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256",
"clientProvidedHostHeader": "fantasticlogs-niffler-archive.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com"
}
}

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Tactics: Collection Exfiltration

Techniques:
  • T1530 — Data from Cloud Storage — Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.
  • T1537 — Transfer Data to Cloud Account — Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service.