CreatePolicy
AWS
CreatePolicy
Event
Creates a new managed IAM policy that can be attached to users, groups, or roles to define permissions.
Security Context
- Adversaries attach overly permissive policies to maintain persistent, elevated access even after initial credentials are rotated.
Log Source
CloudTrail
Sample Event
Adversarial. Draco creates a customer-managed IAM policy named OccamyPipelineDebugAccess that grants *:* (all actions, all resources). The policy name is innocuous-looking; the policy document is a single Allow * * statement. He’ll attach it to himself or a backdoor role in a follow-up AttachUserPolicy/AttachRolePolicy event. Custom policy creation is harder to alarm on than direct attachment of AdministratorAccess because it doesn’t reference the well-known AWS-managed admin policy ARN.
{ "eventVersion": "1.09", "userIdentity": { "type": "IAMUser", "principalId": "AIDADRAC0MALF0YBADGY", "arn": "arn:aws:iam::555123456789:user/draco", "accountId": "555123456789", "accessKeyId": "AKIADRAC0MALF0YEXAMP5", "userName": "draco", "sessionContext": { "attributes": { "creationDate": "2026-04-15T18:51:02Z", "mfaAuthenticated": "false" } } }, "eventTime": "2026-04-16T00:11:32Z", "eventSource": "iam.amazonaws.com", "eventName": "CreatePolicy", "awsRegion": "us-east-1", "sourceIPAddress": "203.0.113.66", "userAgent": "aws-cli/1.18.147 Python/3.7.10 Linux/5.4.0-1045-aws botocore/1.18.6", "requestParameters": { "policyName": "OccamyPipelineDebugAccess", "policyDocument": "{\"Version\":\"2012-10-17\",\"Statement\":[{\"Effect\":\"Allow\",\"Action\":\"*\",\"Resource\":\"*\"}]}" }, "responseElements": { "policy": { "policyName": "OccamyPipelineDebugAccess", "policyId": "ANPA0CCAMYDEBUG666660", "arn": "arn:aws:iam::555123456789:policy/OccamyPipelineDebugAccess", "path": "/", "defaultVersionId": "v1", "attachmentCount": 0, "permissionsBoundaryUsageCount": 0, "isAttachable": true, "createDate": "Apr 16, 2026, 12:11:32 AM", "updateDate": "Apr 16, 2026, 12:11:32 AM" } }, "requestID": "90000000-0000-4000-8000-000010010110", "eventID": "90000000-0000-4000-8000-000010010111", "readOnly": false, "eventType": "AwsApiCall", "managementEvent": true, "recipientAccountId": "555123456789", "eventCategory": "Management", "tlsDetails": { "tlsVersion": "TLSv1.3", "cipherSuite": "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256", "clientProvidedHostHeader": "iam.amazonaws.com" }}MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Tactics: Persistence Privilege Escalation
Techniques:
- T1098 — Account Manipulation — Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include accoun...